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Efficient and Expressive Keyword Search Over
Encrypted Data in Cloud
Hui Cui, Zhiguo Wan, Robert H. Deng, Guilin Wang, and Yingjiu Li
Abstract—Searchable encryption allows a cloud server to conduct keyword search over encrypted data on behalf of the data users
without learning the underlying plaintexts. However, most existing searchable encryption schemes only support single or conjunctive
keyword search, while a few other schemes that are able to perform expressive keyword search are computationally inefficient since
they are built from bilinear pairings over the composite-order groups. In this paper, we propose an expressive public-key searchable
encryption scheme in the prime-order groups, which allows keyword search policies (i.e., predicates, access structures) to be
expressed in conjunctive, disjunctive or any monotonic Boolean formulas and achieves significant performance improvement over
existing schemes. We formally define its security, and prove that it is selectively secure in the standard model. Also, we implement the
proposed scheme using a rapid prototyping tool called Charm [37], and conduct several experiments to evaluate it performance. The
results demonstrate that our scheme is much more efficient than the ones built over the composite-order groups.
Index Terms—Searchable encryption, cloud computing, expressiveness, attribute-based encryption.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Consider a cloud-based healthcare information system
that hosts outsourced personal health records (PHRs) from
various healthcare providers. The PHRs are encrypted in
order to comply with privacy regulations like HIPAA. In
order to facilitate data use and sharing, it is highly desir-
able to have a searchable encryption (SE) scheme which
allows the cloud service provider to search over encrypted
PHRs on behalf of the authorized users (such as medical
researchers or doctors) without learning information about
the underlying plaintext. Note that the context we are con-
sidering supports private data sharing among multiple data
providers and multiple data users. Therefore, SE schemes
in the private-key setting [1], [2], [3], which assume that a
single user who searches and retrieves his/her own data,
are not suitable. On the other hand, private information
retrieval (PIR) protocols [4], [5], [6], which allow users to
retrieve a certain data-item from a database which publicly
stores data without revealing the data-item to the database
administrator, are also not suitable, since they require the
data to be publicly available. In order to tackle the keyword
search problem in the cloud-based healthcare information
system scenario, we resort to public-key encryption with
keyword search (PEKS) schemes, which is firstly proposed
in [7]. In a PEKS scheme, a ciphertext of the keywords called
“PEKS ciphertext” is appended to an encrypted PHR. To
retrieve all the encrypted PHRs containing a keyword, say
“Diabetes”, a user sends a “trapdoor” associated with a
• H. Cui (hcui@smu.edu.sg) is with the Secure Mobile Centre, Singapore
Management University, Singapore.
• Z. Wan (wanzhiguo@sdu.edu.cn) is with the School of Computer Science
and Technology, Shandong University, Jinan, China.
• R. H. Deng (robertdeng@smu.edu.sg) and Y. Li (yjli@smu.edu.sg) are
with the School of Information Systems, Singapore Management Univer-
sity, Singapore.
• G. Wang (wang.guilin@huawei.com) is with the Shield Lab, Central
Research Institute, Huawei International Pte Ltd, Singapore.
Manuscript received , 2016; revised , 2016.
search query on the keyword “Diabetes” to the cloud service
provider, which selects all the encrypted PHRs containing
the keyword “Diabetes” and returns them to the user while
without learning the underlying PHRs. However, the solu-
tion in [7] as well as other existing PEKS schemes extending
from [7] only support equality queries [8].
Set intersection and meta keywords1 [9], [10] can be used
for conjunctive keyword search. However, the approach
based on set intersection leaks extra information to the cloud
server beyond the results of the conjunctive query, whilst the
approach using meta keywords require 2m meta keywords
to accommodate all the possible conjunctive queries for m
keywords. In order to address the above deficiencies in
conjunctive keyword search, schemes such as the ones in
[11], [12] were put forward in the public-key setting.
Ideally, in the practical applications, search predicates
(i.e., access policies or structures) should be expressive such
that they can be expressed as conjunction, disjunction or any
Boolean formulas2 of keywords. In the above cloud-based
healthcare system, to find the relationship between diabetes
and age or weight, a medical researcher may issue a search
query with an access structure (i.e., predicate) (“Illness =
Diabetes” AND (“Age = 30” OR “Weight = 150-200”)). SE
schemes supporting expressive keyword access structures
were presented in [8], [13], [14], [15]. Unfortunately, the
scheme in [13] has exponentially increasing complexity [16],
while the schemes in [8], [14], [15] are based on the in-
efficient bilinear pairing over the composite-order groups
[17]. Though there exist techniques [17] to convert pairing-
based schemes from composite-order groups to prime-order
groups, there is still a significant performance degradation
1. Meta keywords are composed of several keywords. For example,
a document that contains the keywords “Bob”, “urgent” and “finance”
may be augmented with the meta-keyword “Bob: urgent: finance”
2. In this paper, unless otherwise specified, the Boolean formulas we
talk about are monotonic. That is, they consist of only AND and OR
gates, for example, A AND (B OR C).
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due to the required size of the special vectors [18].
In this paper, we propose a public-key based expressive
SE scheme in the prime-order groups, which is especially
suitable for keyword search over encrypted data in scenar-
ios of multiple data owners and multiple data users such
as the cloud-based healthcare information system that hosts
outsourced PHRs from various healthcare providers.
1.1 Overview of Our Proposed Scheme
Our expressive SE scheme consists of a trusted trapdoor
generation center which publishes a public system parame-
ter and keeps a master key in secret, a cloud server which
stores and searches encrypted data on behalf of data users,
multiple data owners who upload encrypted data to the
cloud, and multiple data users who would like to retrieve
encrypted data containing certain keywords. To outsource
an encrypted document to the cloud, a data owner appends
the encrypted document with encrypted keywords, and
uploads the encrypted document and the corresponding
encrypted keywords to the cloud. To retrieve all encrypted
documents containing keywords satisfying a certain access
structure such as (“Illness = Diabetes” AND (“Age = 30”
OR “Weight = 150-200”)), a data user first obtains a trap-
door associated with the access structure from the trapdoor
generation center, and then sends the trapdoor to the cloud
server. The latter will conduct the search and return the
corresponding encrypted documents to the data user.
The basic idea of our scheme is to modify a key-policy
attributed-based encryption (KP-ABE) scheme constructed
from bilinear pairing over the prime-order groups. Without
loss of generality, we will use the large universe KP-ABE
scheme selectively secure in the standard model proposed
by Rouselakis and Waters in [18] to illustrate our construc-
tion during the rest of the paper. In KP-ABE, a ciphertext is
computed with respect to a set of attributes and an access
policy is encoded into a user’s private key. A ciphertext can
be decrypted by a private key only if the set of attributes
associated with the ciphertext satisfies the access policy
associated with the private key. Access policies in [18] can be
very expressive, supporting any monotonic Boolean formu-
las. At first sight, a KP-ABE scheme can be transformed to
an expressive SE scheme by treating attributes as keywords
to be searched, by directly transforming the key generation
algorithm on attribute access structures to a trapdoor gener-
ation algorithm on keyword search predicates, and by using
the decryption algorithm to test whether keywords in a
ciphertext satisfy the predicate in a trapdoor. However, KP-
ABE schemes (e.g., [18], [19]) are not designed to preserve
privacy of attributes (keywords) associated with the cipher-
texts. Specifically, given a ciphertext (without information
on attributes), the attributes (keywords) in the ciphertext can
be discerned by anyone using solely the public parameter.
In the following, to keep our description compact and
consistent, we will use access structure, access policy and
search predicate interchangeably.
In order to hide keywords in a ciphertext, inspired by the
“linear splitting” technique in [20], we firstly split ciphertext
components corresponding to every keyword into two ran-
domized complementary components. Thus, even though
the ciphertext still contains information about the keywords,
this information is computationally infeasible to be obtained
from the public parameter and the ciphertext. We secondly
re-randomize trapdoor components corresponding to every
keyword associated with an access structure to match the
split components in the ciphertext.
In addition to hiding keywords in ciphertexts, we also
need to preserve keyword privacy in a trapdoor which
contains an access structure as a component. First, to p-
reserve keyword privacy in an access structure, we adopt
the method in [21] to divide each keyword into a generic
name and a keyword value. Since keyword values are much
more sensitive than the generic keyword names, the key-
word values in an access structure are not disclosed to the
cloud server, whereas a partial hidden access structure with
only generic keyword names is included in a trapdoor and
sent to the cloud server. Take the aforementioned keyword
access structure (“Illness = Diabetes” AND (“Age = 30”
OR “Weight = 150-200”)) as an instance, “Illness”, “Age”
and “Weight” are the generic names whilst “Diabetes”,
“30” and “200” are the keyword values. Consequently, the
partial hidden access structure (“Illness” AND “Age” OR
“Weight”) is included in the trapdoor. Second, as in all the
PEKS schemes, trapdoors are subject to the offline keyword
dictionary guessing attacks. That is, anyone who knows
a trapdoor and the public parameter may discover the
keyword values embedded in the trapdoor by launching
exhaustive searching attacks on keyword values. As a rem-
edy to such attacks, we assign a designated cloud server
as introduced in [22] to perform the searching operations.
We equip this designated server with a public and private
key pair of which the public key will be used in trapdoor
generation such that it is computationally infeasible for
anyone without knowledge of the privacy key to derive
keywords information from the trapdoor. Thus, trapdoors
can be delivered to the cloud server over a public channel.
We define a security model for expressive SE, which
takes into account all adversarial capabilities of the standard
SE security notion. The adversary is able to learn trapdoors
over access structures of its choice, but it should not be able
to learn any information about the keyword values in the
challenge ciphertext. Note that since the Rouselakis-Waters
KP-ABE scheme [18], which the proposed SE scheme is built
upon, is selectively secure, our expressive SE scheme can
only be proved to be selectively secure where the adversary
has to commit the challenge keyword set in advance.
1.2 Contributions
Below we briefly summarize our contributions in this paper.
• We propose the first expressive SE scheme in the
public-key setting from bilinear pairings in the prime-
order groups. As such, the proposed SE scheme is
not only capable of expressive multi-keyword search,
but also significantly more efficient than existing
schemes built in the composite-order groups.
• Using a randomness splitting technique, our scheme
achieves security against offline keyword dictionary
guessing attacks to the ciphertexts. Moreover, to
preserve the privacy of keywords against offline
keyword dictionary guessing attacks to trapdoors,
we divide each keyword into generic name and
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keyword value and assign a designated cloud server
to conduct search operations in our construction.
• We formalize the security definition of expressive SE,
and formally prove that our proposed expressive SE
scheme is selectively secure in the standard model.
• We implement our scheme using a rapidly proto-
typing tool called Charm, and conduct extensive
experiments to evaluate its performance. Our results
confirm that the proposed scheme is sufficiently effi-
cient to be applied in practice.
1.3 Related Work
Public-Key Encryption with Keyword Search. After Boneh
et al. [7] initiated the study of public-key encryption with
keyword search (PEKS), several PEKS constructions were
put forth using different techniques or considering differ-
ent situations [8], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [22], [23], [24],
[25], [26], [27], [28], [29]. They aim to solve two cruces
in PEKS: (1) how to make PEKS secure against offline
keyword dictionary guessing attacks; and (2) how to achieve
expressive searching predicates in PEKS. In terms of the
offline keyword dictionary guessing attacks, which requires
that no adversary (including the cloud searching server)
can learn keywords from a given trapdoor, to the best
of our knowledge, such a security notion is very hard to
be achieved in the public-key setting [30]. Regarding the
expressive search, there are only few works in PEKS [8], [13],
[14], [15]. Unfortunately, the construction in [13] is built on
the basis of inner-product predicate encryption [16], and the
constructions in [8], [14], [15] are built from the pairings in
composite-order group. Therefore, they are not sufficiently
efficient to be adopted in the practical world [16], [17].
Moreover, the number of keywords allowed in these search-
able schemes are predefined in the system setup phase. We
compare our scheme to other keyword search schemes in
Table 1. It is straightforward to see that compared to the
existing ones, our construction make a good balance in that
it allows unbounded keywords, supports expressive access
structures, and is built in the prime-order groups.
Private-key Searchable Encryption. In a private-key SE
setting, a user uploads its private data to a remote database
and keeps the data private from the remote database ad-
ministrator. Private-key SE allows the user to retrieve all
the records containing a particular keyword from the re-
mote database [1], [2], [3]. However, as the name suggests,
private-key SE solutions only apply to scenarios where data
owners and data users totally trusted each other.
Private Information Retrieval. With respect to public
database (e.g., stock quotes) where the user wishes to search
for some data-item without revealing to the database ad-
ministrator which item it is, private information retrieval
(PIR) [4], [5], [6] protocols were introduced to allow a user
to retrieve data from a public database with far smaller com-
munication rather than downloading the entire database.
Nevertheless, in our context, the database is not publicly
available, so the PIR solutions cannot be applied.
1.4 Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we briefly review some of the notions and definitions
to be used in the paper. In Section 3, after depicting the sys-
tem architecture for our expressive keyword search system,
we give a concrete expressive keyword search scheme. In
Section 4, we discuss the properties and several extensions
of our expressive keyword search scheme. We implement
our scheme and compare it with related works in Section 5.
We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review some basic cryptographic notions
and definitions that are to be used later.
2.1 Bilinear Pairings and Complexity Assumptions
Let G be a group of prime order p with a generator g. Let eˆ :
G × G → G1 be an efficiently computable bilinear pairing
function satisfying the following properties [31].
• Bilinear: for all g ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Z∗p , we have
eˆ(ga, gb) = eˆ(g, g)ab.
• Non-degenerate: eˆ(g, g) 6= 1.
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption [31].
The decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem is
that for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, given
g, ga, gb, gc, it is difficult to distinguish (g, ga, gb, gc,
eˆ(g, g)abc) from (g, ga, gb, gc, Z), where g ∈ G, Z ∈ G1, a,
b, c ∈ Z∗p chosen independently and uniformly at random.
Decisional (q− 2) Assumption [18]. Let q be an integer.
The decisional (q − 2) problem is that for any probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm, given
−→
A =
g, gx, gy, gz, g(xz)
2
gbi , gxzbi , gxz/bi , gx
2zbi , gy/b
2
i , gy
2/b2i ∀ i ∈ [q],
gxzbi/bj , gybi/b
2
j , gxyzbi/bj , g(xz)
2bi/bj ∀ i, j ∈ [q], i 6= j,
it is difficult to distinguish (
−→
A , eˆ(g, g)xyz) from (
−→
A , Z),
where g ∈ G, Z ∈ G1, x, y, z, b1, ..., bq ∈ Z∗p chosen
independently and uniformly at random.
Decisional Linear Assumption [32]. The decisional lin-
ear problem is that for any probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm, given g, gx1 , gx2 , gx1x3 , gx2x4 , it is difficult to
distinguish (g, gx1 , gx2 , gx1x3 , gx2x4 , gx3+x4) from (g, gx1 ,
gx2 , gx1x3 , gx2x4 , Z), where g, Z ∈ G, x1, x2, x3, x4 ∈ Z∗p
chosen independently and uniformly at random.
2.2 Access Structures and Linear Secret Sharing
Following the definition in [33], [34], we describe the notions
of access structures and linear secret sharing schemes.
Definition 1. (Access Structure). Let {P1, ..., Pn} be a set of
parties. A collection A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn} is monotone if ∀B,C :
if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C , then C ∈ A. An (monotone) access
structure is a (monotone) collection A of non-empty subsets
of {P1, ..., Pn}, i.e., A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn} \ {∅}. The sets in A are
called the authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called
the unauthorized sets.
In our construction, we only consider monotone access
structures. Notice that general access structures in large uni-
verse ABE can be realized by splitting the attribute universe
in half and treating the attributes of one half as the negated
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TABLE 1
Comparisons of expressive keyword search schemes, where “KGAs” denotes keyword guessing attacks.
Keyword Privacy Expressiveness Bilinear Group Security Unbounded
keywords
BCOP04 [7] KGAs on trapdoors AND prime full, random oracle yes
KSW13 [16] KGAs on trapdoors AND, OR composite full, standard model no
LZDLC13 [8] KGAs on trapdoors AND, OR composite full, standard model no
LHZF14 [14] KGAs on trapdoors AND, OR, NOT composite full, standard model no
Our scheme KGAs on trapdoors by AND, OR prime selective, standard model yes
the designated server only
(NOT) versions of the attributes in the other half [35]. Also,
it has been presented in [36], [37] how to describe non-
monotonic access structures in terms of monotonic access
structures with negative (NOT) shares.
Definition 2. (Linear Secret Sharing Schemes). Let P be a
set of parties. Let M be a matrix of size l×n. Let ρ : {1, ..., l}
→ P be a function that maps a row to a party for labeling.
A secret sharing scheme Π over a set of parties P is a linear
secret-sharing scheme (LSSS) over Zp if
1) The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
2) There exists a matrix M which has l rows and n
columns called the share-generating matrix for Π.
For i = 1, ..., l, the x-th row of matrix M is labeled
by a party ρ(i), where ρ : {1, ..., l} → P is a function
that maps a row to a party for labeling. Considering
that the column vector −→v = (µ, r2, ..., rn), where
µ ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared and r2, ..., rn ∈
Zp are randomly chosen, then M−→v is the vector of
l shares of the secret µ according to Π. The share
(M−→v )i belongs to party ρ(i).
It has been noted in [33] that every LSSS also enjoys the
linear reconstruction property. Suppose that Π is an LSSS for
an access structure A. Let A be an authorized set, and define
I ⊆ {1, ..., l} as I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ A}. Then the vector (1, 0, ...,
0) is in the span of rows of M indexed by I , and there exist
constants {wi ∈ Zp}i∈I such that, for any valid shares {vi}
of a secret µ according to Π, we have
∑
i∈I wivi = µ. These
constants {wi} can be found in the polynomial time in terms
of the size of the share-generating matrix M [38]. On the
other hand, for an unauthorized set A′, no such constants
{wi} exist. Also, in this case it is true that if I ′ = {i|ρ(i) ∈
A′}, there exists a vector −→w such that its first component w1
is any non zero element in Zp and < Mi,−→w > = 0 for all
i ∈ I ′, where Mi is the i-th row of M [18].
Boolean Formulas [33]. Access structures can also be
described in terms of monotonic boolean formulas. LSSS
access structures are more general, and can be derived from
representations as boolean formulas. There are techniques to
convert any monotonic boolean formula into a correspond-
ing LSSS matrix3. The boolean formula can be represented
as an access tree, where the interior nodes are AND and OR
gates, and the leaf nodes denote attributes. The number of
the rows in the corresponding LSSS matrix will be the same
as the number of the leaf nodes in the access tree.
3. Please refer to [33] on how to convert a boolean formula into an
equivalent LSSS matrix.
3 EFFICIENT AND EXPRESSIVE KEYWORD
SEARCH WITH UNBOUNDED KEYWORDS
In this section, we describe the system model, design goals,
threat model and algorithms of our expressive SE scheme.
3.1 System Model and Design Goals
Designated 
Cloud 
ServerCloud
Data 
Owner W1, …, Wm
Data 
User
Document 1 Keyword set W1
…… ……
Document n Keyword set Wn
Encrypted Documents 
and the corresponding 
encrypted keywords 
Illness = 
Diabetes
OR
Gender = 
Male
Affiliation = 
City Hospital
AND
Full access 
structure
Department = 
Medicine
AND
Trapdoor 
Generation
Center
Illness
OR
Gender
Affiliation
AND
Partial hidden 
access structure
Department
AND
Cloud
Fig. 1. Architecture of expressive keyword search system.
The architecture of our SE system is shown in Fig. 1,
which is composed of four entities: a trusted trapdoor gener-
ation centre who publishes the system parameter and holds
a master private key and is responsible for the trapdoor
generation, data owners who upload the encrypted data to
a public cloud, data users who are privileged to search and
access the encrypted data, and a designated cloud server
who executes the keyword search operations for data users.
To enable the cloud server to search over ciphertexts, the
data owners append every encrypted document with en-
crypted keywords4. A data user issues a trapdoor request by
sending an access structure over keywords to the trapdoor
generation centre which generates and returns a trapdoor
corresponding to the access structure. We assume that the
trapdoor generation centre has a separate authentication
mechanism to verify each data user and then issue them
the corresponding trapdoors. After obtaining a trapdoor, the
data user sends the trapdoor with a corresponding partial
hidden access structure (i.e., the access structure without
keyword values) to the designated cloud server. The latter
performs the testing operations between each ciphertext
and the trapdoor using its private key, and forwards the
matching ciphertexts to the data user.
4. Note that each keyword is composed of a generic name and a
keyword value.
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As mentioned earlier, a ciphertext created by a data own-
er consists of the encrypted document generated using an
encryption scheme and the encrypted keywords generated
using our SE scheme. From now on, we only consider the
latter part of the encrypted document, and ignore the first
part since it is out of the scope of this paper.
In summary, the design goals of our expressive SE
scheme are fourfold.
• Expressiveness. The proposed scheme should sup-
port keyword access structures expressed in any
Boolean formula with AND and OR gates.
• Efficiency. The proposed scheme should be ade-
quately efficient in terms of computation, commu-
nication and storage for practical applications.
• Keyword privacy. First, a ciphertext without its cor-
responding trapdoors should not disclose any in-
formation about the keyword values it contains to
the cloud server and outsiders. Second, a trapdoor
should not leak information on keyword values to
any outside attackers without the private key of the
designated cloud server. We capture the semantic
security for the SE scheme to ensure that encrypted
data does not reveal any information about the key-
word values, which we call “selective indistinguisha-
bility against chosen keyword-set attack (selective
IND-CKA security)” (See Appendix A).
• Provable security. The security of the proposed
scheme should be formally proved under the stan-
dard model rather than the informal analysis.
3.2 Threat Model
We assume that the trapdoor generation centre is a trusted
entity. The cloud server is assumed to be “honest-but-
curious”, i.e., it will honestly follow the protocol but it is
also curious to learn any private information from the data
stored in the cloud. Data owners are assumed to honestly
store their data, while data users are not trusted, and they
can even collude with a malignant cloud server in order
to discover private information of other parties. We assume
that the trusted trapdoor generation centre is equipped with
a separate authentication mechanism to verify data users
before issuing trapdoors to users. Also, we assume that all
adversaries have bounded computational capability, so they
cannot break the aforementioned difficult problems.
3.3 Construction
In the system, the trusted trapdoor generation centre is giv-
en the public parameter and the master private key generat-
ed by the Setup algorithm, and uses the Trapdoor algorithm
to generate a trapdoor TM for some keyword set associated
with an access structure (M, ρ, {Wρ(i)}) at the request of a
privileged data user, where M is an access matrix, ρ is the
function that associates the rows of M to the generic names
of keywords, and {Wρ(i)} are the corresponding keyword
values5. The cloud server is given a public and private key
pair created by the sKeyGen algorithm, and will input the
trapdoor given by a data user and its private key to the Test
5. To be distinguishable from the keyword value Wi in a ciphertxt,
we use Wρ(i) to denote the keyword value in a trapdoor.
algorithm to determine whether a document contains the
keywords satisfying the search predicate (M, ρ, {Wρ(i)})
specified by the data user.
Let G be a group of prime order p with a generator g,
and eˆ : G × G → G1 be the bilinear map. On the basis
of the KP-ABE scheme proposed by Rouselakis and Waters
[18], which we will refer to as the Rouselakis-Waters KP-
ABE scheme, we describe our expressive and unbounded
SE system in the prime-order groups as follows.
• Setup. This algorithm takes the security parameter
1λ as input. It randomly chooses a group G of prime
order p, a generator g and random group elements
u, h, w ∈ G. Also, it randomly chooses α, d1, d2, d3,
d4 ∈ Z∗p , and computes g1 = gd1 , g2 = gd2 , g3 = gd3 ,
g4 = g
d4 . Finally, it publishes the public parameter
pars = (H , g, u, h, w, g1, g2, g3, g4, eˆ(g, g)α), where
H is a collision-resistant hash function that maps
elements in G1 to elements in G, and keeps the
master private key msk = (α, d1, d2, d3, d4).
• sKeyGen. This algorithm takes the public parameter
pars as the input. It randomly chooses γ ∈ Z∗p , and
outputs the public and private key pair (pks, sks) =
(gγ , γ) for the server.
• Trapdoor. This algorithm takes the public parameter
pars, the server public key pks, the master pri-
vate key msk and an LSSS access structure (M, ρ,
{Wρ(i)}) as the input, where M is an l × n matrix
over Zp, the function ρ associates the rows of M to
generic keyword names, and {Wρ(i)} are the corre-
sponding keyword values. Let Mi be the i-th row
of M for i ∈ {1, ..., l}, and ρ(i) be the keyword
name associated with this row by the mapping ρ.
It randomly chooses a vector −→y = (α, y2, ..., yn)⊥
where y2, ..., yn ∈ Zp, r, r′ ∈ Zp, t1,1, t1,2, ..., tl,1,
tl,2 ∈ Zp, computes T = gr , T ′ = gr′ , and outputs
the trapdoor TM,ρ =
(
(M, ρ), T , T ′, {Ti,1, Ti,2, Ti,3,
Ti,4, Ti,5, Ti,6}i∈[1,l]
)
as
Ti,1 = g
viwd1d2ti,1+d3d4ti,2 ,
Ti,2 = H(eˆ(pks, T
′)r) · gd1d2ti,1+d3d4ti,2 ,
Ti,3 = ((u
Wρ(i)h)ti,1)−d2 , Ti,4 = ((uWρ(i)h)ti,1)−d1 ,
Ti,5 = ((u
Wρ(i)h)ti,2)−d4 , Ti,6 = ((uWρ(i)h)ti,2)−d3 ,
where vi = Mi · −→y is the share associated with the
row Mi of the access matrix M. Note that only (M, ρ)
is included in the trapdoor TM,ρ.
• Encrypt. This algorithm takes the public parameter
pars and a keyword set W (each keyword is denoted
as Ni = Wi, where Ni is the generic keyword name
and Wi is the corresponding keyword value) as the
input. Let m be the size of W, and W1, ..., Wm ∈
Zp be the values of W. It randomly chooses µ, s1,1,
s1,2, ..., sm,1, sm,2, z1, ..., zm ∈ Zp, and outputs
a ciphertext CT =
(
C , D, {(Di, Ei,1, Ei,2, Fi,1,
Fi,2)}i∈[1,m]
)
as
C = eˆ(g, g)αµ, D = gµ, Ei,2 = g2
si,1 , Fi,2 = g4
si,2 ,
Di = w
−µ(uWih)zi , Ei,1 = g1zi−si,1 , Fi,1 = g3zi−si,2 .
Note that in the implementation, to efficiently con-
duct keyword search, the ciphertext will be stored
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along with the generic names {Ni} corresponding to
keyword values {Wi}. Thus, before performing the
Test algorithm on the encrypted keyword values, the
matching on the keyword names will be executed,
thereby reducing the searching time.
• Test. This algorithm takes the public parameter pars,
the server private key sks, a ciphertext
(
C , D, {(Di,
Ei,1, Ei,2, Fi,1, Fi,2)}
)
on a keyword set W and a
trapdoor TM,ρ associated with an access structure
(M, ρ, {Wρ(i)}) as the input. It calculates IM,ρ from
(M, ρ), which is a set of minimum subsets satisfying
(M, ρ). It then checks whether there is an I ∈ IM,ρ
satisfying∏
i∈I
(
eˆ(D,Ti,1)eˆ(Di,
Ti,2
H(eˆ(T, T ′)γ)
)eˆ(Ei,1, Ti,3)
eˆ(Ei,2, Ti,4)eˆ(Fi,1, Ti,5)eˆ(Fi,2, Ti,6)
)wi
= C,
where
∑
i∈I wiMi = (1, 0, ..., 0). It outputs 0 if there
is no element in IM,ρ satisfying this equation or 1
otherwise.
Remarks. In our construction, the term gzi in the original
construction [18] is split into g1zi−si,1 and g2si,1 . Thus, Wi
is subtly hidden from the ciphertext. To see this, we have
eˆ(Di, g1) = eˆ(w,D)
−1 · eˆ(uWih, g1zi),
where the term g1zi is embedded in g1zi−si,1 , which cannot
be computed from g1zi−si,1 without knowing the value of
g1
si,1 . Nevertheless, given g2si,1 , it is difficult to compute
the value of g1si,1 . Similarly, the result works with g3zi−si,2 ,
g4
si,2 as well. Note that some redundant elements as g3, g4,
Ti,5, Ti,6, Fi,1, Fi,2 are introduced in our scheme to make
the proof go smoothly.
3.4 Correctness
If the keyword set W embedded in a ciphertext satisfies the
access structure associated with the trapdoor, we will have∑
i∈I viwi = α. Therefore,∏
i∈I
(
eˆ(D,Ti,1)eˆ(Di,
Ti,2
H(eˆ(T, T ′)γ)
)eˆ(Ei,1, Ti,3)
)wi
(
eˆ(Ei,2, Ti,4)eˆ(Fi,1, Ti,5)eˆ(Fi,2, Ti,6)
)wi
=
∏
i∈I
eˆ(gµ, gviwd1d2ti,1+d3d4ti,2)wi
· eˆ(w−µ(uWih)zi , gd1d2ti,1+d3d4ti,2)wi
· eˆ(g1zi−si,1 , ((uWρ(i)h)ti,1)−d2)wi
· eˆ(g2si,1 , ((uWρ(i)h)ti,1)−d1)wi
· eˆ(g3zi−si,2 , ((uWρ(i)h)ti,2)−d4)wi
· eˆ(g4si,2 , ((uWρ(i)h)ti,2)−d3)wi
= eˆ(g, g)µ
∑
i∈I viwi = eˆ(g, g)αµ
3.5 Security Proof
Theorem 1. Under the decisional BDH assumption, the
(q − 2) assumption and the decisional linear assumption,
our SE scheme is selectively indistinguishable under chosen
keyword-set attacks (selective IND-CKA security).
Proof. The details of the selective IND-CKA security def-
inition and its proof are given in Appendix B. The proof
is divided into two parts, depending on the role of the
adversary. In the first part, the adversary is assumed to be
an outside attacker, and in the second part, the adversary
is assumed to be the cloud server who performs search
operations.
4 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the properties as well as exten-
sions of our expressive SE scheme.
4.1 Keyword Privacy
Keyword Value Guessing Attacks on Ciphertexts. We
briefly review the encryption algorithm of the KP-ABE
scheme in [18], and then show that there exists a keyword
value guessing attack if it is directly transformed into a
searchable encryption scheme. Let m denote the size of
W, and W1, ..., Wm ∈ Zp be the specific values of W.
It randomly chooses µ, z1, ..., zm ∈ Zp, and outputs a
ciphertext CT =
(
C , D, {(Ci, Di)}i∈[1,m]
)
.
C = eˆ(g, g)αµ, D = gµ,
∀i ∈ [m] Ci = w−µ(uWih)zi , Di = gzi ,
where g, u, h, w, eˆ(g, g)α are the public parameters.
Given a ciphertext CT =
(
C , D, {(Ci, Di)}i∈[1,m]
)
, an
adversary can easily determine whether a keyword value
W ′i is incorporated in the ciphertext by checking whether
the following equation holds.
eˆ(Ci, g) = eˆ(w
−1, D) · eˆ(uW ′ih,Di).
In order to prevent such attacks, in our construction, we
use a “linear splitting” technique [20] on each keyword val-
ue related component of the ciphertext, and re-randomize
the components upon each keyword value in the trapdoor.
The former step prevents keyword value guessing attacks
to the ciphertext while the latter step allows the trapdoor to
be used for testing keyword values in the ciphertext.
Keyword Value Guessing Attacks on Trapdoors. Con-
cerning this security requirement, we need to tackle two
problems in our construction. First, keywords associated
with a trapdoor must be hidden from the access structure.
We address this problem by separating each keyword into a
generic name and a keyword value, i.e., each keyword is in
the form of “generic name = keyword value”, and a partial
hidden access structure, i.e., the full access structure with
keyword values being removed (See Fig. 1) is incorporated
in a trapdoor and given to the designated cloud server.
Second, the entire trapdoor should be immune to the offline
keyword value guessing attacks [25]. In our SE system,
we resort to a weaker security notion by requiring that a
trapdoor will not disclose information about the keyword
values in the ciphertext to an adversary excluding the cloud
server who executes the searching operations. We assign a
designated cloud server [22] to conduct search and equip it
with a public and private key pair. Since the components in
a trapdoor are tied with the public key of the server, only
the designated cloud server with the corresponding private
key is capable to learn the keyword values hidden in the
trapdoor by performing offline guessing attacks.
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4.2 Unbounded keyword search
In the “small universe” KP-ABE constructions (e.g., [18]),
the size of the keyword space is polynomially bounded in
the security parameter and the keywords are fixed at the
setup phase. Moreover, the size of the public parameter
grows linearly with the number of keywords [8], [14], [15].
On the contrary, in the “large universe” constructions, the
size of the keyword space can be exponentially large, so
it is much more desirable in the real-world applications.
Our construction of the expressive SE scheme inherits the
advantages of the Rouselakis-Waters scheme [18]. Thus, it
is straightforward to see that in our SE scheme, the size
of the public parameter is immutable with the number of
keywords, and the number of the keywords allowed for the
system is unlimited and can be freely set.
4.3 Extensions
Our expressive SE scheme can be extended in several ways.
• Expressive searchable encryption for range search.
Range search is an important requirement for search-
able encryption in many applications. By defining the
keywords in a hierarchical manner as shown in [27],
we can directly expand our SE system to support a
class of simple range search [27]. Take a keyword
name “Age” with keyword values from 0 to 100 as
an example. The path of the leaf node “11-20” is (“0-
100”, “0-30”, “11-20”), and “0-30”, “0-10” are simple
ranges from level-2 and level-3, respectively.
• Anonymous KP-ABE. Our SE system is built by
making the Rouselakis-Waters KP-ABE scheme [18]
anonymous. Therefore, it can be easily extended
to obtain an unbounded and anonymous KP-ABE
scheme in the prime-order groups without random
oracles, where given a ciphertext, an adversary learns
no information on the associated attribute set.
• Anonymous hierarchical identity-based encryption
(HIBE). The Rouselakis-Waters KP-ABE scheme in
[18] can be converted to an HIBE scheme using non-
repeating identities, “AND” policies and delegation
capabilities [19]. Since our SE scheme can be used
to construct an anonymous KP-ABE scheme, it can
be further converted to an anonymous HIBE scheme
using the same method as in [19].
5 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare the computational cost, com-
munication and storage overhead of our scheme with other
existing schemes, and implement the proposed expressive
SE scheme in the prime-order group in Charm [39].
5.1 Comparison
Let |pars|, |msk|, |CT|, |TM,ρ|, |M| be the sizes of the
public parameter, the master private key, the ciphertext, the
trapdoor and the access structure, respectively. Let k be the
length of the vector corresponding to the ciphertext in [16],
l be the number of keywords in an access structure, n be
the maximum number of keywords allowed for the system,
and m be the size of a keyword set ascribed to a ciphertext.
Denote E as an exponentiation operation, P as a pairing
operation, χ1 as the number of elements in IM,ρ = {I1,
..., Iχ1}, χ2 as |I1| + ... + |Iχ1 |, and χ3 as the number of
primed keywords [14] in a search predicate. We compare
TABLE 2
Comparison of Storage and Communication Overhead.
Public Master Trap- Cipher-
parameter private key door text
|pars| |msk| |TM,ρ| |CT|
KSW13 [16] 2k + 3 2k + 4 2k + 1 + |M| 2k + 1
LZDLC13 [8] n+ 5 n+ 4 2l + |M| m+ 2
LHZF14 [14] n+ 4 n+ 2 3l + |M| m+ 2
Our Scheme 9 5 6l + |M| 5m+ 2
our expressive SE scheme with the other ones from [8], [14],
[16] in Table 2 which are all constructed over the composite-
order groups. From Table 2, it is not difficult to see that
our construction is the only one that supports unbounded
number of keywords in the expressive keyword search
systems. Note that our scheme is measured in terms of the
number of elements in the prime-order groups while the
other three schemes are measured in terms of the number
of elements in the composite-order groups. According to
the analysis in [40]6, in terms of the pairing-friendly elliptic
curves, prime-order groups have a clear advantage in the
parameter sizes over composite order groups.
TABLE 3
Comparison of Computation Overhead.
KSW13 [16] LZDLC13 [8] LHZF14 [14] Ours
Trap- 6k · E 4l · E 4l · E 16l · E
door + E
Enc. 4k · E 2(m+ 1) · E (m+2) · E 7m · E
+ E + P + 2 · E
Test 2k · P ≤ χ2 · E ≤ χ2 · E ≤ χ2 · E
+ P + 2χ2 · P + 2χ2 · P + E + P
+ 2χ3 · P + 6χ2 ·P
Group Composite Composite Composite Prime
Order
In Table 3, we compare the computational costs incurred
in the systems from [8], [14], [16] and our expressive SE
scheme. It is worth noticing that as mentioned in [17], “a
Tate pairing on a 1024-bit composite-order elliptic curve
is roughly 50 times slower than the same pairing on a
comparable prime-order curve, and this performance gap
will only get worse at higher security levels”. Therefore,
although our SE system requires more exponentiation and
pairing operations than the other systems, it is far more
efficient than the other three schemes.
5.2 Experimental Results
We implement our scheme in a framework developed to fa-
cilitate rapid prototyping of cryptographic schemes and pro-
tocols called Charm [39]7. Written in the Python program-
6. See Table 3 in [40] for the results.
7. For the explicit information on Charm, please refer to [39]. Note
that since it has been clearly shown in [18], [40] that the efficiency
of schemes in composite-order groups is much worse than that of
schemes in prime-order groups, we will not implement those schemes
in composite-order groups (e.g., [8], [14], [16]). In addition, the current
version Charm does not support cryptographic schemes in composite-
order groups.
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ming language, Charm enables one to implement a crypto-
graphic scheme with very few lines of code, significantly
reducing development time. Meanwhile, computationally
intensive mathematical operations are implemented with
native modules, so the overhead due to Python in Charm
is less than 1%. Since all Charm routines are designed under
the asymmetric groups, our construction is transformed to
the asymmetric setting before the implementation. That is,
three groups G, Gˆ and G1 are used and the pairing eˆ is a
function from G × Gˆ to G1. Notice that it has been stated
in [18] that the assumptions and the security proofs can be
converted to the asymmetric setting in a generic way.
We use Charm of version Charm-0.43 and Python 3.4 in
our implementation. Along with Charm-0.43, we install the
latest PBC library for underlying cryptographic operations.
Our experiments are simulated under 64-bit Ubuntu 15.10
on an all-in-one desktop with Intel Core i7-4785T CPU (4
core 2.20GHz) and 8GB RAM.
The computational costs of the Setup and sKeyGen algo-
rithms are straightforward, and we focus on the computa-
tional costs of the Trapdoor, Encrypt and Test algorithms. In
our experiments, a set of keywords is generated, of which
every keyword contains a generic name such as “Illness”,
“Position”, “Affiliation” and a keyword value such as “Di-
abetes”, “Doctor”, and “City Hospital”. For the sake of
simple implementation, we use integers to denote keyword
values, e.g., a keyword as “Illness = 6” is expressed by
“Illness = Diabetes”. In this way, we generate a random set
of keywords containing 10 to 50 keywords, and use them
to create 80,000 ciphertexts. We then remove the keyword
values in the ciphertexts such that they contain only generic
names of keywords like “Illness”, “Position”, as specified in
the concrete construction.
Thereafter, we randomly choose 2 to 10 keywords to
form a random access structure. The number of keywords
in a searching query is normally less than 10, according
to the searching query logs of search engines [41]. The
access policy is formed such that for any interior node the
difference on the node number of its left branch and that
of its right branch is less than 2. We generate 50 different
access policies, 10 for each different number of keywords,
and create a trapdoor for each access policy. Then, we
remove the keyword values from the trapdoors, so the
access policy in a trapdoor contains only keyword names,
e.g., ((“Illness” AND “Position”) OR “Affiliation”). Also, we
take each trapdoor to conduct search over the ciphertexts.
For any combination of the keyword names in the ciphertext
that satisfies the access policy of the trapdoor, our keyword
search scheme runs the Test algorithm to further confirm
whether it is an exact match.
All these experiments are conducted over 4 different
elliptic curves: SS512, MNT159, MNT201 and MNT224, of
which SS512 is a supersingular elliptic curve with the bilin-
ear pairing on it being symmetric Type 1 pairing, and the
pairings on the other three curves are asymmetric Type 3
pairings. These four curves provides security levels of 80-
bit, 80-bit, 100-bit and 112-bit, respectively.
Fig. 2 shows the computational overhead for generating
trapdoors containing 2 keywords to 10 keywords, from
which we can see that the computation time for the trapdoor
generation is almost linear to the number of keywords as-
sociated with the access structure in the trapdoor. The MNT
curves with higher security levels have longer computation
time, so MNT224 has higher computation cost among all
curves. The computation time of SS512 is close to that
of MNT224 due to its higher exponentiation cost over G.
The computation time of generating a trapdoor with 10
keywords is only 0.22s for MNT224, which is quite modest
for a powerful trapdoor generation centre.
2 4 6 8 10
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
C
om
pu
ta
tio
n 
Ti
m
e 
(s
)
No. of Keywords in Trapdoor
 SS512
 MNT159
 MNT201
 MNT224
Fig. 2. Computational cost of the Trapdoor algorithm for different curves
with respect to number of keywords in trapdoor.
Fig. 3 demonstrates the computation time for the Encrypt
algorithm over 10 keywords to 50 keywords. As expected
in our analysis, it shows that the computation time is
approximately linear to the number of keywords used to
generate the ciphertext. The MNT curves with higher secu-
rity levels are more expensive in computation cost, while
the encryption cost of SS512 is much less than that of MNT
curves. This is due to the fact that (4m+ 1) exponentiations
are done in Gˆ for the total (7m + 2) exponentiations (see
Table 3). To encrypt a document with 50 keywords using
MNT224 curve, the computation time is about 1.6s, which is
acceptable for most applications.
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Fig. 3. Computational cost of the Encrypt algorithm for different curves
with respect to number of keywords in ciphertext.
The computational cost for the Test algorithm is much
more complicated. It depends on χ2, the total number of
keywords in all combinations of keywords satisfying the
access policy that need to be tried by the cloud server. χ2 is
determined by the access policy and the keywords used to
encrypt a document. Fig. 4 shows the relation between the
computation time of the Test algorithm and the number of
keywords in the access structure of the Trapdoor algorithm.
From Fig. 4, it is easy to see that the computation time raises
as the number of keywords in the trapdoor and the cipher-
text increases. When the trapdoor contains only 2 keywords,
the computation time increases quite slowly as keywords
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Fig. 4. Experimental results for the Test algorithm over different elliptic curves.
in ciphertexts increases. Whilst when the trapdoor has 10
keywords, the computation time grows exponentially as the
number of keywords in ciphertexts grows. Among all the
curves, SS512 has the best performance, while MNT224 has
the highest computational cost. For the 4 curves tested in our
experiments, the computation time of searching a document
ranges from 20s to 250s for a trapdoor with 10 keywords
and a ciphertext with 50 keywords. The computation time
can be significantly reduced if keyword search is performed
by a powerful cloud server.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In order to allow a cloud server to search on encrypted data
without learning the underlying plaintexts in the public-
key setting, Boneh [7] proposed a cryptographic primitive
called public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS).
Since then, considering different requirements in practice,
e.g., communication overhead, searching criteria and secu-
rity enhancement, various kinds of searchable encryption
systems have been put forth. However, there exist only a
few public-key searchable encryption systems that support
expressive keyword search policies, and they are all built
from the inefficient composite-order groups [17]. In this
paper, we focused on the design and analysis of public-key
searchable encryption systems in the prime-order groups
that can be used to search multiple keywords in expres-
sive access policies. Based on a large universe key-policy
attribute-based encryption scheme given in [18], we present-
ed an expressive searchable encryption system in the prime-
order groups which supports expressive access structures
expressed in any monotonic Boolean formulas. Also, we
proved its security in the standard model, and analyzed its
efficiency using the Charm [39] framework.
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APPENDIX A
SYSTEM FRAMEWORK AND SECURITY DEFINITION
Our expressive SE scheme consists of setup algorithm Setup,
server key generation algorithm sKeyGen, trapdoor genera-
tion algorithm Trapdoor, encryption algorithm Encrypt and
testing algorithm Test.
• Setup(1λ) → (pars, msk). Taking the security pa-
rameter λ as the input, this setup algorithm outputs
the public parameter pars and the master private
key msk for the system. This algorithm is run by
the trapdoor centre.
• sKeyGen(pars) → (sks, pks). Taking the public pa-
rameter pars as the input, the server key generation
algorithm outputs a public and private key pair for
the designated searching server. This algorithm is
run by the trapdoor centre.
• Trapdoor(pars, pks, msk, (M, ρ, {Wρ(i)})) → TM.
Taking the public parameter pars, the server public
key pks and an access structure (M, ρ, {Wρ(i)}) over
the universe of keywords as the input, this trapdoor
generation algorithm generates a trapdoor TM. This
algorithm is run by the trapdoor centre.
• Encrypt(pars, W) → CT. Taking the public parame-
ter pars and a set of keywords W as the input, this
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encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext CT. This
algorithm is run by the data owner.
• Test(pars, sks, CT, TM) → 1/0. Taking the public
parameter pars, the server private key sks, a cipher-
text CT associated with a keywords set W and a
trapdoor TM for an access structure (M, ρ, {Wρ(i)})
as the input, this testing algorithm outputs either 1
when the ciphertext satisfies the access structure of
the trapdoor TM or 0 otherwise. This algorithm is
run by the designated server.
We require that an expressive SE scheme Π is correct,
meaning that for all the sets of keywords W and access struc-
tures M such that M(W) = 1, if (pars, msk) ← Setup(1λ),
(pks, sks) ← sKeyGen(pars), TM ← Trapdoor(pars, pks,
msk, (M, ρ, {Wρ(i)})), CT ← Encrypt(pars, W), then
Test(pars, sks, CT, TM) = 1.
Following the security model introduced in [7], [25], we
give the security definition for an expressive SE scheme over
encrypted data to ensure that such a scheme does not reveal
any information about the keyword values in the ciphertext,
which we call “indistinguishability against chosen keyword-
set attack (IND-CKA)”. Formally, we describe the IND-CKA
security in the following game between a challenger algo-
rithm B and an adversary algorithm A, where algorithm
A is divided into algorithm A1 (which is assumed to be
a designated cloud (searching) server) and algorithm A2
(which is assumed to be an outside attacker).
1) The security game between algorithm B and algo-
rithm A1 is to guarantee that the searching server
cannot tell which ciphertext encrypts which key-
word set without the trapdoors for the access struc-
tures satisfied by the keywords associated with the
ciphertexts. This is because once the server is given
a trapdoor that the keyword set in a ciphertext can
satisfy, the server will ascertain that this ciphertext
contains at least the keywords associated with the
access structure in the given trapdoor.
• Setup. Algorithm B runs the Setup algorithm
to obtain the public parameter pars and the
master private key msk. It gives the public
parameter pars to algorithm A1 and keeps
msk to itself. In addition, algorithm B runs
the sKeyGen algorithm to obtain a public and
private key pair (pks, sks) for the server. It
then gives (pks, sks) to algorithm A1.
• Phase 1. Algorithm A1 adaptively issues
queries to algorithm B for the trapdoors cor-
responding to the access structures (M1, ρ1
{Wρ1(i)}), ..., (Mq1 , ρq1 , {Wρq1 (i)}). For each
(Mj , ρj , {Wρj(i)}) with j ∈ [1, q1], algorithm
B runs the Trapdoor algorithm, and sends
TMj to algorithm A1.
• Challenge. Algorithm A1 outputs two key-
word sets W∗0, W
∗
1 of the same size with the
restriction that W∗0 and W
∗
1 satisfy none of the
queried trapdoors. Algorithm B selects a ran-
dom bit β ∈ {0, 1}, and sends the challenge
ciphertext CT∗ to algorithm A1 by running
the Encrypt algorithm on W∗β .
• Phase 2. Algorithm A1 continues issu-
ing queries to algorithm B for the trap-
doors corresponding to the access structures
(Mq1+1, ρq1+1, {Wρq1+1(i)}), ..., (Mq , ρq ,{Wρq(i)}) with the restriction that any (Mj ,
ρj , {Wρj(i)}) for j ∈ [q1 +1, q] can be satisfied
by neither W∗0 nor W
∗
1.
• Guess. Algorithm A1 outputs its guess β′ ∈
{0, 1} and wins the game if β′ = β.
2) The security game between algorithm B and al-
gorithm A2 is to ensure that the outsider attacker
who has not obtained the searching server’s private
key cannot determine the set of keyword values
associated with the ciphertext even though the at-
tacker gets the trapdoors over the access structures
satisfied by the keywords associated with the ci-
phertexts. This is because the server’s public key
is embedded in the trapdoors such that no one can
determine whether a trapdoor matches the keyword
set of a ciphertext without the server’s private key.
• Setup. Algorithm B runs the Setup algorithm
to obtain the public parameter pars and the
master private key msk. It gives the public
parameter pars to algorithm A2 and keeps
msk to itself. Also, algorithm B runs the sKey-
Gen algorithm to obtain a public and private
key pair (pks, sks) for the server. It then gives
pks to algorithm A2 and keeps sks to itself.
• Phase 1. Algorithm A2 adaptively issues
queries to algorithm B for the trapdoors cor-
responding to the access structures (M1, ρ1
{Wρ1(i)}), ..., (Mq1 , ρq1 , {Wρq1 (i)}). For each
(Mj , ρj , {Wρj(i)}) with j ∈ [1, q1], algorith-
m B runs the trapdoor generation algorithm
Trapdoor, and sends TMj to algorithm A2.
• Challenge. Algorithm A2 outputs two key-
word sets W∗0, W
∗
1 of the same size. Algorithm
B selects a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, and sends
the challenge ciphertext CT∗ to algorithm A2
by running the Encrypt algorithm on W∗β .
• Phase 2. Algorithm A2 continues issuing
queries to algorithm B for the trapdoors cor-
responding to the access structures (Mq1+1,
ρq1+1, {Wρq1+1(i)}), ..., (Mq , ρq , {Wρq(i)}).
• Guess. Algorithm A2 outputs its guess β′ ∈
{0, 1} and wins the game if β′ = β.
For A ∈ {A1,A2}, an expressive SE scheme Π is IND-
CKA secure if the advantage function referring to the secu-
rity game GameINDΠ,A
AdvINDΠ,A(λ)
def
= Pr[β = β′]
is negligible in the security parameter λ for any probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) adversary algorithm A.
In addition, an expressive SE scheme is said to be selec-
tively IND-CKA secure8 if an Init stage is added before the
8. Note that selective IND-CKA security is weaker than IND-CKA
security, but it is a useful tool in security reduction and is widely used
in the cryptographic systems.
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Setup phase where algorithm A commits to the challenge
keyword sets W∗0, W
∗
1 which it aims to attack.
APPENDIX B
SECURITY PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof is divided into two parts, depending on the role of
the adversary. In the first part, the adversary is assumed to
be an outside attacker, and in the second part, the adversary
is assumed to be the server.
Proof. In terms of the first part of the proof, we prove it via
a sequence of games, where game Game0 is the same as
the original game, and game Game1 is the same as Game0
except that the trapdoors might be generated in a different
way. We finish the proof by showing that if there exists an
outside adversary algorithm A that can distinguish game
Game1 from game Game0, then we can build a challenger
algorithm B that solves the decisional BDH assumption.
• Algorithm A gives algorithm B two challenge key-
word sets W∗0 = {W ∗0,1, ..., W ∗0,m} and W∗1 = {W ∗1,1,
..., W ∗1,m}.
• Setup. Algorithm B runs the Setup algorithm to
generate the public parameter and the master private
key as required, and sets the public and private key
pair for the server as (ga, a).
• Phase 1. Since algorithm B knows the master private
key, it easily outputs the trapdoor on any access
structures as required. If algorithm A issues a trap-
door generation query on an access structure that can
be satisfied by W∗β , algorithm B computes T = gc,
T ′ = gb, Ti,2 = H(eˆ(g, g)abc)gd1d2ti,1+d3d4ti,2 ,
and generates the other elements of the trapdoor as
in the Trapdoor algorithm.
• Challenge. Algorithm B runs the Encrypt algorithm
on W∗β to obtain the challenge ciphertext CT
∗, and
gives CT∗ to algorithm A.
• Phase 2. The same as that in Phase 1.
• Guess. Algorithm A output a guess β′ for β.
On the one hand, if Z = eˆ(g, g)abc, then algorithm A’s
view of this simulation is identical to the original game.
On the other hand, if Z is randomly chosen from G1, then
algorithm A’s advantage is nil. Therefore, if algorithm A
can discern game Game1 from game Game0 with a non-
negligible probability, algorithm B has a non-negligible
probability in breaking the decisional BDH problem.
Concerning the second part of the proof, we prove the
security using a sequence of games. For simplicity, we
remove the access structure from the ciphertext, and denote(
C∗, D∗, {(D∗i , E∗i,1, E∗i,2, F ∗i,1, F ∗i,2)}
)
as the challenge
ciphertext given to the adversary during an attack in the
real world. Let Z be a random element of G1, and {Zi,1},
{Z ′i,1} be random elements of G. We define the following
games which differ on the type of the challenge ciphertext
is given by the challenger to the adversary.
• Game0: The challenge ciphertext is CT∗0 =
(
C∗, D∗,
{(D∗i , E∗i,1, E∗i,2, F ∗i,1, F ∗i,2)}i∈[1,m]
)
.
• Game1: The challenge ciphertext is CT∗1 =
(
Z , D∗,
{(D∗i , E∗i,1, E∗i,2, F ∗i,1, F ∗i,2)}i∈[1,m]
)
.
• Game2: The challenge ciphertext is CT∗2 =
(
Z , D∗,
(D∗1 , Z1,1, E
∗
1,2, F
∗
1,1, F
∗
1,2), {(D∗i , E∗i,1, E∗i,2, F ∗i,1,
F ∗i,2)}i∈[2,m]
)
.
• · · · · · ·
• Gamem+1: The challenge ciphertext is CT∗m+1 =
(
Z ,
D∗, {(D∗i , Zi,1, E∗i,2, F ∗i,1, F ∗i,2)}i∈[1,m]
)
.
• Gamem+2: The challenge ciphertext is CTm+2 =
(
Z ,
D∗, (D∗1 , Z1,1, E
∗
1,2, Z
′
1,1, F
∗
1,2), {(D∗i , Zi,1, E∗i,2, F ∗i,1,
F ∗i,2)}i∈[2,m]
)
.
• · · · · · ·
• Game2m+1: The challenge ciphertext is CT∗2m+1 =(
Z , D∗, {(D∗i , Zi,1, E∗i,2, Z ′i,1, F ∗i,2)}i∈[1,m]
)
.
To complete the proof, we will show that the games
Game0, Game1, ..., Game2m+1 are computationally indis-
tinguishable from each other.
Lemma 1. Under the (q− 2) assumption, the advantage for
a polynomial time adversary that can distinguish between
the games Game0 and Game1 is negligible.
Proof. Assume that there is an adversary algorithm A that
can distinguish Game0 from Game1. Then we can build a
challenger algorithm B that can solve the (q − 2) problem.
• Init. Algorithm A gives algorithm B two challenge
keyword sets W∗0 = {W ∗0,1, ..., W ∗0,m} and W∗1 =
{W ∗1,1, ..., W ∗1,m}.
• Setup. In order to generate the public system pa-
rameter, algorithm B implicitly sets α = xy. Then
algorithm B randomly chooses β ∈ {0, 1}, d1, d2, d3,
d4, u˜, h˜ ∈ Zp, and computes the public parameter
pars = (g, u, h, w, g1, g2, g3, g4, eˆ(gx, gy)) as follows.
g = g, w = gx, g1 = g
d1 , g2 = g
d2 ,
g3 = g
d3 , g4 = g
d4 , u = gu˜ ·
∏
i∈[m]
gy/b
2
i ,
h = gh˜ ·
∏
i∈[m]
(gxz/bi) ·
∏
i∈[m]
(gy/b
2
i )−W
∗
β,i .
• Phase 1 and Phase 2. Algorithm B has to create the
trapdoors for the access structures (M, ρ, {ρ(i)})9
required by algorithm A that are not satisfied by
either W∗0 or W
∗
1.
Since W∗β does not satisfy (M, ρ), there exists a vector−→w = (w1, ..., wn)⊥ ∈ Znp such that w1 = 1 and Mi ·−→w
= 0 for all i ∈ [l] such that ρ(i) ∈ W∗β . Algorithm B
computes−→w using linear algebra. The vector−→y to be
shared is implicitly set as−→y = xy−→w+(0, y˜2, ..., y˜n)⊥,
where y˜2, ..., y˜n ∈ Zp. This is a properly distributed
vector with first component as xy = α and the other
components being uniformly random in Zp. As a
result, for each row i ∈ [l], the share is
vi = Mi · −→y = xy(Mi · −→w ) + (Mi · (0, y˜2, ..., y˜n)⊥)
= xy(Mi · −→w ) + v˜i.
As mentioned above, for each row i for which
ρ(i) ∈ W∗β , Mi · −→w = 0. In this case, vi = v˜i =
9. For easy notation, in the rest of the proof, we use ρ(i) to replace
Wρ(i) in the construction.
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Mi · (0, y˜2, ..., y˜n)⊥, which is known to algorithm
B, so algorithm B randomly chooses ti ∈ Zp, and
outputs {Ti,1, Ti,2, Ti,3, Ti,4, Ti,5, Ti,6} as in the
Trapdoor algorithm.
For each row i /∈W∗β , algorithm B randomly chooses
t˜i,1, t˜i,2 ∈ Zp, and implicitly sets
ti,1 =
−y
2d1d2
(Mi · −→w ) +
∑
j∈[m]
xzbj(Mi · −→w )
ρ(i)−W ∗β,j
+ t˜i,1,
ti,2 =
−y
2d3d4
(Mi · −→w ) +
∑
j∈[m]
xzbj(Mi · −→w )
ρ(i)−W ∗β,j
+ t˜i,2.
Note that ti,1, ti,2 are properly distributed due to t˜i,1,
t˜i,2. The intuition behind this is that the exponent y
raises the power of w to the secret α = xy. Though
this also results to the exponents xyz/bj from h, it
can be cancelled by the provided exponents xzbj
on the y/b2j part. Thus, algorithm B can output the
elements of the trapdoor TM,ρ as follows.
Ti,1 = g
viwd1d2ti,1+d3d4ti,2
= gv˜i · (
∏
j∈[n]
(gx
2zbj )
Mi·−→w
ρ(i)−W∗
β,j · wt˜i,1)d1d2
· (
∏
j∈[n]
(gx
2zbj )
Mi·−→w
ρ(i)−W∗
β,j · wt˜i,2)d3d4 .
Ti,2 = g
d1d2ti,1+d3d4ti,2
= (gy)−Mi·
−→w
· ( ∏
j∈[m]
(gxzbj )
Mi·−→w
ρ(i)−W∗
β,j · gt˜i,1)d1d2 ,
· ( ∏
j∈[m]
(gxzbj )
Mi·−→w
ρ(i)−W∗
β,j · gt˜i,2)d3d4 .
Ti,3 = ((u
ρ(i)h)−ti,1)−d2
=
(
(gy)(Mi·
−→w )(ρ(i)u˜+h˜))−d2
· ( ∏
j∈[m]
(gxzbj )
−(ρ(i)u˜+h˜)(Mi·−→w)
ρ(i)−W∗
β,j
)−d2
· ( ∏
(j,k)∈[m,m]
(g(xz)
2bk/bj )
−(Mi·−→w)
ρ(i)−W∗
β,k
)−d2
· ( ∏
j∈[m]
(gy
2/b2j )(Mi·
−→w )(ρ(i)−W∗β,j))−d2
· ( j 6=k∏
(j,k)∈[m,m]
(g
xyzbk
b2
j )
−(Mi·−→w)(ρ(i)−W∗β,j)
ρ(i)−W∗
β,k
)−d2
· ((uρ(i)h)−t˜i,1)−d2 .
Since Ti,3, Ti,4, Ti,5, Ti,6 have the term (uρ(i)h)−ti,1
in common, and d1, d2, d3 and d4 are known to algo-
rithm B, algorithm B can simply compute Ti,4, Ti,5,
Ti,6 as Ti,3. Thus, algorithm B successfully responds
to algorithm A’s trapdoor queries.
• Challenge. To generate a challenge ciphertext, al-
gorithm B implicitly sets µ = z from the q − 2
assumption, and zi = bi for every i ∈ [m]. Notice
that these parameters are properly distributed since
z, b1, ..., bq are information theoretically hidden from
the view of algorithmA. Also, algorithm B randomly
chooses s1,1, s1,2, ..., sm,1, sm,2 ∈ Zp, and computes
the challenge ciphertext CT∗ =
(
C∗, D∗, E∗, F ∗,
{(D∗i , E∗i , F ∗i )}i∈[1,m]
)
to algorithm A, where
C∗ = Z, D∗ = gz, E∗i,2 = g2
si,1 , F ∗i,2 = g4
si,2 ,
D∗i = w
−µ(uW
∗
β,ih)zi
=
j 6=i∏
j∈[m]
gxzbi/bj
j 6=i∏
j∈[m]
(gybi/b
2
j )W
∗
β,i−W∗β,j
· gbi(u˜W∗β,i+h˜),
E∗i,1 = g1
zi−si,1 = (gbi−si,1)d1 = (gbi/gsi,1)d1 ,
F ∗i,1 = g3
zi−si,2 = (gbi−si,2)d1 = (gbi/gsi,2)d3 .
• Guess. Algorithm A output a guess β′ for β.
On the one hand, if Z = eˆ(g, g)xyz , then algorithm A’s
view of this simulation is identical to the original game.
On the other hand, if Z is randomly chosen from G1, then
algorithm A’s advantage is nil. Therefore, if algorithm A
can distinguish game Game1 from game Game0 with a
non-negligible probability, algorithm B has a non-negligible
probability in breaking the (q − 2) assumption.
Lemma 2. Under the decisional linear assumption, the
advantage for a polynomial time adversary that can dis-
tinguish between the games Gamem+1 and Gamem for
m ∈ [1,m] is negligible.
Proof. Assuming that there is an adversary algorithmA that
can distinguish Gamem from Gamem+1, we can build a
challenger algorithm B to solve the decisional linear prob-
lem.
• Init. Algorithm A gives algorithm B two challenge
keyword sets W∗0 = {W ∗0,1, ..., W ∗0,m}, W∗1 = {W ∗1,1,
..., W ∗1,m}.
• Setup. In order to generate the public system pa-
rameter, algorithm B implicitly sets d1 = x2, d2
= x1. Then algorithm B randomly chooses d3, d4,
β ∈ {0, 1}, α, y, w˜ ∈ Zp, and computes the public
parameter pars = (g, u, h, w, g1, g2, g3, g4, eˆ(g, g)α).
g = g, w = gw˜, g1 = g
x2 , g2 = g
x1 ,
g3 = g
x3 , g4 = g
x4 , u = gx2α,
h = g−x2αW
∗
β,mgy, eˆ(g, g)α = eˆ(g, g)α.
• Phase 1 and Phase 2. In order to create a trapdoor
for an access structure (M, ρ) required by algorithm
A that is satisfied by neither W∗0 nor W∗1, algorithm
B performs as follows. It randomly chooses −→y = (α,
y2, ..., yn)⊥ where y2, ..., yn ∈ Zp. Also, it randomly
chooses t1,1, t1,2, ..., tl,1, tl,2 ∈ Zp. For each i ∈ [l],
algorithm B sets vi = Mi · −→y ,
t˜i,1 =
ti,1α(ρ(i)−W ∗β,m)
x2α(ρ(i)−W ∗β,m) + y
,
t˜i,2 = ti,2 +
yx1ti,1
d3d4(ρ(i)−W ∗β,m)x2 + y
.
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Then it outputs the trapdoor as
Ti,1 = g
vi(gx1ti,1gti,2d3d4)w˜ = gviwd1d2 t˜i,1+d3d4 t˜i,2 ,
Ti,2 = g
x1ti,1gti,2d3d4 = gd1d2 t˜i,1+d3d4 t˜i,2 ,
Ti,3 = (g
x1)−α(ρ(i)−W
∗
β,m)ti,1 = ((uρ(i)h)t˜i,1)−d2 ,
Ti,4 = (g
x2)−α(ρ(i)−W
∗
β,m)ti,1 = ((uρ(i)h)t˜i,1)−d1 ,
Ti,5 = (g
x1)−α(ρ(i)−W
∗
β,m)ti,2 = ((uρ(i)h)t˜i,2)−d2 ,
Ti,6 = (g
x2)−α(ρ(i)−W
∗
β,m)ti,2 = ((uρ(i)h)t˜i,2)−d1 .
• Challenge. To generate a challenge ciphertext, algo-
rithm B implicitly sets sm,1 = x3, zm = x3 +x4 from
the decisional linear assumption. In addition, algo-
rithm B randomly chooses µ, s1,1, ..., sm−1,1, s1,2, ...,
sm,2 ∈ Zp, z1, ..., zm−1 ∈ Zp. Thus, algorithm B can
calculate the challenge ciphertext as follows.
1) For i = m, algorithm B outputs
C∗ = eˆ(g, g)αµ, D∗ = gµ,
D∗m = w
−µ(uW
∗
β,mh)zm = w−µZy,
E∗m,1 = g1
zm−s1 = gx2x4 ,
E∗m,2 = g2
sm,1 = gx1x3 ,
F ∗m,1 = Z
d3 · g3−sm,2 , F ∗m,2 = g4sm,2 .
2) For any i ∈ [m− 1], algorithm B outputs
D∗i = w
−µ(uW
∗
β,ih)zi , E∗i,1 = g1
zi−si,1 ,
E∗i,2 = g2
si,1 , F ∗i,1 = g3
zi−si,2 , F ∗i,2 = g4
si,2 .
• Guess. Algorithm A output a guess β′ for β.
On the one hand, if Z = gx3+x4 , then the view of
algorithm A to this simulation is identical to the original
game. On the other hand, if Z is randomly chosen from
G, then the advantage of algorithm A is nil. Therefore,
if algorithm A can distinguish game Gamem from game
Gamem+1 with a non-negligible probability, algorithm B has
a non-negligible probability in breaking the decisional linear
assumption.
Lemma 3. Under the decisional linear assumption, the
advantage for a polynomial time adversary that can distin-
guish between the games Gamem′+m+1 and Gamem′+m for
m′ ∈ [1,m] is negligible.
Proof. This proof follows almost the same as that of Lemma
2, except that the simulation is done over the parameters g3
and g4 instead of g1 and g2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
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